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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON TRIALS BY
MILITARY COMMISSIONS *
HAROLD L. KAPLAN f
I. JURISDICTION OF THE MILITARY COMMISSION
While the military commission is recognized as a legal tribunal
for trials under proper circumstances, there is little to define with any
degree of precision what those "proper circumstances" are, or how the
commission should operate.' The only statute that deals with such tri-
bunals is the Articles of War, but actually, there is little in the Articles
to indicate the extent of the jurisdiction of or the procedure for such
commissions. For the great mass of offenses which are not covered
by or provided for in the Articles of War and which might be referred
to the military commission, we must look to the law of war.
2
Under this law of war which is constitutionally recognized,3 rules
have been developed from decided cases, opinions of high ranking offi-
cials such as the Attorneys-General, Judge Advocates General, and
Writings of recognized authorities such as Colonel Winthrop who has
frequently been referred to as the Blackstone of Military Law. Those
rules that have been developed indicate the extent of the jurisdiction of
the military commissions which for the purpose of this discussion may
be divided into the four aspects indicated by Colonel Winthrop:
A-Time; B-Persons; C-Offenses; D-Place.
* The first half of this article appeared in the December, 1943, issue of the RvvEw.
t' A. B., 1929, Upsala College; LL. B., 1932, Fordham University; J. S. D., i943,
New York University; member, New Jersey and Federal Bars.
i. It is ofttimes mentioned that the advantage of the military commission over the
statutory military tribunals, is that the commission's jurisdiction is not exactly defined,
and its procedure is not prescribed.
The author of a Note in (i943) 56 HARv. L. REv. 631, 642, expresses the opinion that
in view of the fact that military commissions generally follow the procedure of courts-
martial; that the latter follow generally the rules prevailing in the United States Dis-
trict courts; therefore, a defendant tried by a military commission will usually have
the same protective rights as though tried in a civil court, jury trial excepted. In addi-
tion, the defendant will have the benefit of an automatic appeal under the review pro-
cedure of 46th Article of War. But the author of the Note further points out that
judging by the Court's failure in the Quirin case to either criticize or declare improper
the discretion exercised by the President, .it may be inferred that the due process clause
of the Constitution does not apply to trials involving offences against the law of war.
It may be added that the Commission's refusal to permit the petitioners the right of
peremptorily challenging a member of the Commission, is further indication of the
inapplicability of the due process clause to trials involving offences against the law of
war.
2.- Rules of Land Warfare, FM 27-Io (War Dept. 1940) rule 3, § 7.
3. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. io.
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Time During Which a Commission May Function
Sir Matthew Hale, discussing the jurisdiction of the Court of the
Constable and Marshal, states that in order for such court to have jur-
isdiction, it must be a time of war that creates such jurisdiction; espe-
cially is this so where capital offenses are involved.4 Brigadier Gen.
G. B. Davis, however, writes that where there is no military govern-
ment or martial law even though the nation be involved in war, a mili-
tary commission cannot assume jurisdiction of a public offense.5 How-
ever, it was settled by the weight of authority that military jurisdic-
tion for the trial of offenses existed during, but only during, three
periods: (i) When military government exists; (2) When martial
law is in effect; (3) When a war is being waged.6 Thus an offense
committed before the time of commencement of one of the foregoing
periods or after its cessation would be beyond the jurisdiction of a mili-
tary commission. Moreover, any statute that sought retroactively to
bring such offenses within the commission's jurisdiction would be ex
post facto, and void.
7
The constitutionality of this rule must be apparent. The history
of the English speaking nations discloses their struggles to win for the
civilian populations the subordination of the military to the civil gov-
ernment. Anticipating that emergencies might arise that would require
the summary power that only the military authority can provide, the
Constitution gave recognition to such situations by granting Congress
the power "To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws
of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions"; s and by
making the President the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy.9
In these provisions and others that we have already seen, is implied the
authority to use military commissions. But when the emergency that
permits the use of such commissions is over, the authority upon which
they are based is likewise over.1 0 Thus, during the periods enumerated
above, the military commissions may constitutionally be employed.
4. I HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (First American ed. 1847) 500.
5. DAVIS, A TREATISE ON THE MILITARY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (3d ed. re-
vised, 1913) 311. -
6. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS (2d ed. i92o) 837. EX parte
Ortiz, ioo Fed. 955 (C. C. D. Minn. igoo) ; In re Egan, 5 Blatchford 319, 8 Fed. Cas.
367, No. 4,303 (C. C. N. D. N. Y. 1866) ; it re Martin, 45 Barb. 146 (N. Y. 1865).
7. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L. Ed. 648 (1798) ; In re Murphy, I7 Fed. Cas.
103o, No. 9,947 .(C. C. D. Mo. 1867) declared unconstitutional as ex post facto, an Act
of Cotigress of I867, 14 STAT. 432. The law was passed to validate acts performed
under proclamations of the President, which were promulgated prior to Congressional
authorization.
8. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, ci. 15.
9. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I § 2, cl. I.
io. Glueck, By What Tribunal Shall War Offenders Be Tried? (I943) 56 HARv.
L. REv. 1059, Io66-67.
. 273
274 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
It has been held also that spies can be tried only so long as the
war continues. Once hostilities cease, the status of such spies changes. 1
This rule is undoubtedly based on the fact that the right to deal with
-spies is because of the danger to the war efforts of the country wherein
such spies are apprehended. With the cessation of war operations, the
danger is over and as a matter of humaneness there is no need for sum-
mary executions.
Persons Subject to Jurisdiction of Military Commissions
The Constitution provides that the Congress shall have power "To
make Rules for the Government of the Land and Naval Forces." Un-
der this constitutional grant, a body of rules has been enacted which
is known as the Articles of War. Therein are enumerated the per-
sons who shall be subject to Military Law. 1' These include in general
terms, officers and soldiers of the Regular Army; members of the Army
Nurse Corps; officers and soldiers of the Marine Corps when detached
for service with the armies of the United States; Cadets; all retainers
to the camp and all persons serving with the armies of the United
States; 13 all persons admitted into the Regular Army Soldiers' Home
at Washington, D. C. There can be little discussion as to the pro-
priety of the trial of the persons enumerated before military tribunals,
be they courts-martial, military commissions or provost courts. 4 The
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution in guaranteeing trial by jury
expressly excepts, "cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger." 15
But the jurisdiction of the military commission has not been con-
fined to our military personnel as we have observed. Civilians have
been tried before such tribunals and it is such cases that have created
II. United States ex rel. Wessels v. McDonald, 265 Fed. 754, 760, 761 (D. C. N.
Y. 1920), appeal dismissed per stipulation 256 U. S. 705, 41 Sup. Ct. 535, 65 L. Ed.
118o (1921); In re Martin, 45 Barb. 142, 144 (N. Y. 1865).
12. Article of War 2.
13. For illustrations of such cases, see Hines v. Mikell, 259 Fed. 28 (C. C. N. Y.
I919), cert. denied sub nom., Mikell v. Hines, 250 U. S. 645, 39 Sup. Ct. 494, 63 L. Ed.
1187 (1919) ; Ex parte Jochen, 257 Fed. 200 (D. C. Texas, 1919) ; Ex parte Weitz,
256 Fed. 58 (D. C. Mass. 1919); Ex parte Falls, 251 Fed. 415 (D. C. N. J. 1918);
Ex parte Gerlach, 247 Fed. 616 (D. C. N. Y. 1917). In Ex parte Henderson, ii Fed.
Cas. lO67, No. 6,349 (C. C. D. Ky. 1878) the court held unconstitutional a statute ren-
dering contractors of supplies for the Army, subject to military tribunals. It was
stated that such legislation violated the right of trial by jury and other guarantees of
the Bill of Rights to which all persons are entitled other than members of the Army
and Navy; contractors, although supplying the Army, are not members thereof.
14. However, the Judge Advocate General of the United States has ruled that trial
of former soldiers who are members of the United States Soldiers' Home would be
illegal unless such defendant also has the status of retired military personnel. See
Manual for Courts-Martial (1921) para. 4 (f).
15. Kurtz v. Moffit, 115 U. S. 487, 6 Sup. Ct 142, 29 L. Ed. 458 (1885).
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problems in Constitutional interpretation, .and differences of opinions
among the authorities.
There are two of the Articles of War that have given rise to con-
siderable discussion among the writers on military law, viz., Articles
8i and 82. The first of these, in referring to the offense of correspond-
ing, relieving or aiding the enemy, reads in part, "Whosoever relieve
the enemy with arms . .. " The second of these articles provides,
"Any person who in time of war shall be found lurking or acting as a
spy in or about any of the fortifications, posts, quarters, or encamp-
ments of any of the armies of the United States, or elsewhere, shall be
tried. . ." A casual reading of these articles would undoubtedly
leave the reader with the opinion that both of these provisions include
not only persons subject to military law, but civilians as well, for does
not the 8Ist Article provide, "Whosoever relieves or attempts to relieve
the enemy . . ."; and does not the 82nd Article read, "Any person
who in time of war shall be found lurking . . ."?
One of the leading authorities in the field of military law has stated
as his opinion that inasmuch as the Articles of War were drawn for the
purpose of governing the armed forces, they should be applied only to
military personnel unless and until the contrary is made manifest. Since
no such contrary intention has been shown, the Articles of War should
be confined to members of the military establishment.' 6
"This," says Professor Morgan, 7 "is obviously unsound. Its
premise is based upon an unduly narrow interpretation of the enacting
clauses of the various military codes; but granting its premise, its con-
clusion is erroneous. It ignores the legislative history 18 of the Article
and disregards the construction administratively accepted and applied
for at least a century. It is supported by no opinion of the judge advo-
cate general, of the attorney general or of the courts." No. case or other
authority of note supports this view. However, General Davis doesn't
deny that civilians may be tried by military commissions, but it is his
view that the jurisdiction of such commissions over civilans, is by vir-
tue of martial law or, as he terms it, necessity. 19
I6. DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 5, at 417. Cf. BuRDicx, THE LAW OF THE AmERICAN
CONSTITUTION (1922) 265, wherein the opinion is advanced that if Article of War 81
is applied to all civilians, it "would seem to go the extreme limit of constitutionality";
as to the 82nd Article referring to the offense of spying, if committed by a United
States citizen it constitutes treason. The author states that to subject citizens to a
military court goes too far constitutionally.
17. Morgan, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Non-Military Persons Under the
Articles of War (1920) 4 MINN. L. REV. 79, 98.
I8. Id. at 1O7.
19. DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 5, at 418.
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The Milligan case, too, recognized that one not a member of the
military forces could be tried by a military commission, provided of
course, that certain conditions were present.
In World War I, one Lather Witcke was convicted by a military
commission at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, on the charge of being a
spy and thus violating the 82nd Article of War.2" Subsequent to his
conviction, questions were raised concerning the legality of such trial
by a military tribunal. In response to a request of President Wilson,
the then Attorney-General, T. W. Gregory ruled that the trial was im-
proper under our Constitution, basing such opinion on the fact that
Witcke was a Russian national, that he had not been in Europe during
the war so that he did not cross over any fighting lines or into any fields
of military operations. Furthermore, it was stated in the opinion that
Witcke could not be treated as a spy because all definitions of that term
referred to one who operates within the lines of an army or within a
theatre of military operations, and no such facts appeared in the instant
case.21  The question of the legality of this trial was later submitted
for re-examination to Mr. Gregory's successor, Attorney-General A.
Mitchell Palmer.22  The latter's opinion, never made public until the
ime of the Quirin case, pointed out that with new facts before him, he
believed that the Witcke trial was proper. Mr. Palmer wrote: "It
appears that my predecessor acted upon the assumption that Witcke,
Who came from Mexico, was a Russian National, and that he was
arrested immediately upon setting foot on our territory. You now
state that Witcke was a German citizen, had crossed into our territory
at least three times within twenty-four hours, and was arrested in the
town of Nogales about a mile distant from encampments where were
stationed officers and men engaged in protecting the border against
threatened invasion from the Mexican side. In my judgment the above
facts, coupled with the further fact that Witcke at the time of his arrest
was found 'lurking or acting as a spy', conferred jurisdiction upon a
court-martial 23 to try him under Article 82 of the Articles of War."
20. There has been considerable confusion in legal literature where the Witcke
case has been referred to. The author was accorded the privilege of examining the
original file in this case, in the office of the Judge Advocate General of the United
States, and the following facts were taken therefrom: The correct name of the defend-
ant was Lather Witcke; his alias, Pablo-Waberski. He was tried by a military com-
mission (not a court-martial) and convicted on August 16, 1918. The commission
sentenced him to be hanged, but the sentence was commuted by President Wilson to
life imprisonment at hard labor. He remained at Leavenworth Prison until November
21, 1923, on which date he was released by order of Secretary of War Weeks, the lat-
ter's decision having been concurred in by President Coolidge.
21. 31 Ops. Atty. Gen. 356.
22. Mr. Gregory's opinion was dated November 25, 1918; that of Mr. Palmer,
December 24, 1919.
23. See note 20 supra.
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This case never went to the courts for a judicial review of the jurisdic-
tional question, but it was reviewed and approved as to jurisdiction and
regularity, by the Board of Review of the office of the Judge Advocate
General of the United States. It would seem, however, that the opinion
of Attorney-General Palmer is sound, especially so where the facts indi-
cate that the defendant was a German citizen and was acting as a spy
in behalf of Germany. The opinion is further ventured that even on
the facts before Mr. Gregory, the legality of the trial should have been
upheld as violative of the law of war,24 this possibility, too, having
been overruled in the latter's opinion. However, on the specific ques-
tion of the trial of civilians by military commissions, the Attorney-
General did not assert that because Witcke was not a member of the
land or naval forces of the United States, it was improper to try him
before a military court; rather, he recognized that persons other than
members of the land or naval forces could be tried by military courts
if the offenses with which they were charged were committed within
the field of military operations, or territory under martial law.
The weight of authority on the question of trial of civilians by mili-
tary commissions, is that such tribunals may take jurisdiction over per-
sons within an area (i) under military government; (2) under martial
law; (3) that is within the theatre or zone of operations .2  The ques-
tion of when a particular area is under military government or under
martial law 26 is not debatable; such status is declared by proclamation
and is known to all with certainty. Whether an area is within a thea-
tre or zone of operations is quite another matter 27 and it is on this
question of fact that the difficulty arises in determining with certainty
whether persons in a particular place may be tried by a military tri-
bunal or whether they may insist upon and be protected in their con-
stitutional rights of trial by jury, and the other guarantees of the Bill
of Rights.
24. Cf. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 15, 63 Sup. Ct. 2, 87 L. Ed. i (1942).
25. Morgan, note I7 supra, at 1o7; Underhill, Jurisdiction on Military Tribunals
in United States Over CiVilians (1924) 12 CALIF. L. REV. 159. Cf. WILLOUGHBY,
PEINCIPLES OF THE QoNSTiTUTiONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1935) 646-647.
26. The classic definitions of martial law and military government are contained
in the minority opinion written by Chief Justice Chase in Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall.
1, 142, i8 L. Ed. 281, 302 (i866) : "Martial law proper . . . is called into action by
Congress, or temporarily, when the action of Congress cannot be invited, and in the
case of justifying or excusing peril, by the President, in times of insurrection or inva-
sion, or of civil or foreign war, within districts or localities where ordinary laws no
longer adequately secure public safety and private rights." Military Government super-
sedes, ". . . as far as may be deemed expedient, the local law, and [is] exercised by
military commander under direction of the President, with the express or implied sanc-
tion of Congress; .
27. Discussed infra at p. 281, in connection with the "Territory" wherein military
commissions have jurisdiction.
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Colonel Archibald King, a respected writer on military law, has
explained the majority view that although the Articles of War begin
"Any person subject to military law . . . ," Articles 8I and 82 begin
respectively "Whosoever" and "Any person," thereby indicating a Con-
gressional intent to subject civilians to trial by military commissions. 28
Whatever the restrictions may be as to the necessity of civilians' offenses
being committed in the theatre of operations, it will be observed that
Colonel King, in using the generic "civilians" includes American citi-
zens as well as others.29 Finally, in the recent Quirin case, the peti-
tioners sought to have the view of Colonel Davis upheld by the Supreme
Court by contending that only members of our armed forces were sub-
ject to the Articles of War, and that the only other persons subject to
trial by military commissions were those included in the 8Ist and 82nd
Articles of War. In order to be included in those Articles, they said,
the offenses charged must have been committed in "Some zone of
active military operations." 30 The United States Supreme Court
passed on neither the Articles cited nor the question of the need that
the offenses charged be committed in "some zone of active military
operations." On the contrary, the Court stated that the charge plainly
indicated a violation of the law of war; that ". . . Entry upon our
territory in time of war by enemy belligerents, including those acting
under the direction of the armed forces of the enemy, for the purpose of
destroying property used or useful in prosecuting the war, is a hostile
and war-like act. It subjects those who participate in it without uni-
form to the punishment prescribed by the law of war for unlawful
belligerents." 31
It would, therefore, appear from the recent Supreme Court pro-
nouncement, that in the conventional schedule of persons subject to trial
by military commissions as set up by the authorities previously referred
28. Miller, Relation of Military to Civil and Administrative Tribunals in Time of
War (1941) 7 ORIo ST. L. J. 188, No. 1o, at 193. Cf. Ex parte Ortiz, IOO Fed. 955
(C. C. D. Minn. igoo); King, The Legality of Martial Law in Hawaii (1942) 30
CALIF. L. REv. 599, 613.
29. Jones v. Seward, 4o Barb. 563 (N. Y. 1863) ; In re Kalanianaole, io Hawaii
29, 6o (Sup. Ci Hawaiian Islands, 1895). Battle, Military Tribunals (1942) 29 VA.
L. REv. 255, 257; Morgan, loc. cit. supra note 17; WIENER, A PRACTICAL MANUAL OF
MARTIAL LAW (1940) io6, 136-137. In their Brief for the United States in the Quirin
case, in dealing with the same question, Attorney General Biddle and Judge Advocate
General Cramer state: "The law of war,- which prohibits spying and other war crimes
behind the lines is not confined to any particular class of persons. Citizen and non-
citizen, military and non-military, are equally condemned." Contra: Smith v. Shaw,
12 Johns. 257, 265 (N. Y. 1815) : "None of the offenses charged against Shaw were
cognizable by a court-martial, except that which related to his being a spy; and if he
were an American citizen, he could not be charged with such an offense. He might be
amenable to the civil authority for treason; but could not be punished under martial
law, as a spy."
3o. Petitioners' Brief, at 31.
31. 317 U. S. I, 36-37, 63 Sup. Ct. 2, 15, 87 L. Ed. 1, 13 (1942).
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to, we must remove the limitation placed on such trials of civilians, viz.,
that the offense must have been committed in the theatre or zone of
operations. If within the wide range of the "law of war" the defendant
offends in matters prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the war
being waged by the United States, the highest court of our country has
indicated its approval of the trial of such a defendant by a military
commission.3
But what is to be said of the constitutionality of this new ruling?
It would seem that with this decision, persons who are not in the land
or naval forces of the United States have been rendered subject to mili-
tary jurisdiction and thus deprived of such constitutional guarantees as
trial by jury, etc.
The Court sustains the constitutionality of its ruling" on the fact
that while presentment by a grand jury and trial by a petit jury in the
vicinage in which the crime was committed were a part of our judicial
system at the time of the adoption of our Constitution for criminal
trials in our civil courts, they were not part of the jurisprudence of our
military courts. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the court con-
tinues, did not enlarge the right of a trial by jury as it existed at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution. Since, as the court has held
on many occasions, petty offenses and criminal contempts that were
triable at common law without a jury, can still be tried that way in fed-
eral courts it is concluded "that Sec. 2 of Article III and the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments cannot be taken to have extended the right to de-
mand a jury to trials by military commission, or to have required that
offenses against the law of war not triable by jury at common law be
tried only in the civil courts." Thus, since Article III, Section II, and
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not give any right to a trial by
jury to defendants charged as enemy belligerents with. having com-
mitted offenses against the law of war, the fact that such defendants
do not come within the exception of the Fifth Amendment "cases aris-
ing in the land and naval forces" (the same exception is implied in the
Sixth Amendment), can in no way improve their position.
With Ex parte Quirin, a new path has been opened for military
commission jurisdiction, but how far it will be permitted to go, only
time will determine. It may be noted though, that greater latitude is
given by this decision to the military commission to bring into its judi-
cial power civilians who up until now, it would have readily said, must
be tried by a civil court.
32. Id. at 40, 63 Sup. Ct. at 17, 87 L. Ed. at i5. To the same effect, see Wn.-
LOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 25, at 644.
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Offenses Cognizable Before Military Commissions
The offenses that may be dealt with by military commissions have
been seen in part, at several points in the discussion thus far. They
may be divided into three general classes: (i) breaches of the law of
war; 33 (2) civil crimes that would ordinarily be tried in civil courts if
functioning normally, as where martial law or military government is
in effect; 3" (3) violations of military orders or regulations, over which
a court-martial would have no jurisdiction under the Articles of War.
3 5
In discussing offenses that are not cognizable by military commis-
sions, Colonel Winthrop mentions purely military offenses that are the
subject of court-martial jurisdiction under the Articles of War; private
matters that are generally subject to civil jurisdictions,36 and finally he
notes that the jurisdiction of such commissions must be confined to
"overt acts, i. e. in unlawful commissions or actual attempts to commit,
and not in intentions merely." 37 But how does this last limitation on
the jurisdiction of the military commission coincide with the holding of
the Supreme Court in the Quirin case? The Chief Justice in his opin-
ion stated: "Nor are petitioners any the less belligerents if, as they
argue, they have not actually committed or attempted to commit any
act of depredation or entered the theatre or zone of active military
operations. The argument leaves out of account the nature of the
offense which the Government charges and which the Act of Congress,
by incorporating the law of war, punishes. It is that each petitioner, in
circumstances which gave him the status of an enemy belligerent,
passed our military and naval lines and defenses or went behind those
lines, in civilian dress and with hostile purpose. The offense was com-
plete when with that purpose they entered-or, having so entered, they
remained upon-our territory in time of war without uniform or other
appropriate means of identification." 38 May it be said that this case
changes the rule as mentioned by Colonel Winthrop? Not at all!
Whereas the latter refers to a trial by a military commission for an
unlawful act where a mere intention to commit is insufficient, the
Supreme Court is not concerned with the commission of such an act;
33. Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. i, 6 L. Ed. 537 (1827).
34. Basic Field Manual, Military Government, FM 27-5 (War Dept. 194o) 49,
§17 (b) (2).
35. WINTHROP, op. cit, supra note 6, at 838-841, illustrates in detail each of the
above categories of offenses. See also, DAvis, op. cit. supra note 5, at 309-310.
36. Basic Field Manual, op. cit. supra note 34, at i8-I9, § 32. But in Mechanics'
and Traders' Bank v. Union Bank, 22 Wall. 276, 22 L. Ed. 871 (1874), the Supreme
Court of the United States upheld a judgment for $13oooo.oo entered by a military court
on a civil case, as within the jurisdiction of such a court set up in territory that was
under martial law.
37. WnrrmoP, op. cit. supra note 6, at 841.
38. 317 U. S. i, 38, 63 Sup. Ct. 2, i6, 87 L. Ed. I, 14 (942).
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they are condemning as unlawful the mere entry into or remaining upon
the territory of the United States for the purpose of committing
sabotage, without outward identification as a member of the army of
the German Reich. This, as a violation of the law of war which is
cognizable by military commission, is the essence of the offense; not
the commission of sabotage, spying, etc. Moreover, it may be said
that the "overt act" referred to by Colonel Winthrop was committed
when ". . . they entered--or, having so entered-they remained
upon--our territory in time of war without uniform or other appro-
priate means of identification." '9 Hence, it would depend upon what
interpretation one wishes to place upon the word "act."
Territories Wherein Military Commissions May Take Jurisdiction
The remaining constitutional question concerning the jurisdiction
of the military commission is that of the territory in which the offense
is committed and wherein the military commission may take jurisdic-
tion. Part of this problem may be dismissed quickly with the state-
ment that if the offense is committed where military government is in
effect, establishment of a military commission is proper to try anyone,
soldier or civilian. This is the rule recognized by the law of nations
as a proper part of war, and under which the conquering nation is in
complete control, subject only to rules of international law applicable
to such conditions, and rules of the victorious government.
40
There is no difficulty in sustaining the constitutionality of such
military governments as a proper part of the responsibility of the
Commander-in-Chief and his subordinate commanders in the field in
waging war. HoweVer, a military government may remain in effect
only until the ratification and exchange of a treaty of peace.41
It is similarly recognized that the military commission is a proper
tribunal in such territory as is under martial law. 42 But the constitu-
tional authority to invoke martial law is by no means apparent on the
39. Ibid. "
40. Santiago v. pI.ogueras, 214 U. S. 260, 29 Sup. Ct. 6o8, 53 L. Ed. 989 (1gog);
Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222, 22 Sup. Ct. 62, 45 L.. Ed. 1074 (i9ol) ; Downes
v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 21 Sup. Ct. 770, 45 L. Ed. lo88 (19O) ; The Grapeshot, 9
Wall. 129, 19 L. Ed. 651 (1869) ; Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 19 L. Ed. 227 (1868) ;
Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164, 14 L. Ed. 889 (1863) ; Hague Convention IV of 19o7,
Annex, § 3; Ballentine, Unconstitutional Military Claims (1915) 24 YALE L. J. 189,
205"; WiLsoN, HANDBOOK: OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1939) 308, 309-312.
41. Ex parte Ortiz, Ioo Fed. 955 (C. C. D. Minn. 19oo); Biixximnp, MILITARY
GOVERNMENT AND MARTIAL LAW (3d ed. revised, 1914) 361-369; WLsoN, op. cit.
supra note 40, at 308, 309, 316.
42. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. Ed. 281 (I866) ; U. S. v. Surratt, 27 Fed.
Cas. 1367, No. 16,423 (1865) (Case of Lincoln Conspirators); BIx=a m, op. cit.
supra note 41, at 525; COOLEY, CONSTUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1898) 156-,57; 31 Opa
Atty. Gen. 356.
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face of the Constitution. We have already seen that-the authority
of the Congress or of the President to declare martial law is implied in
the necessity and urgency of the situation to be dealt with,43 but the
courts have held that in the absence of an abuse of discretion in deter-
mining necessity for the use of the military to suppress disorder, etc.,
they will not pass upon the judgment of the political branch of the
government.
4 4
A third territorial grant of the jurisdiction for the military com-
mission over persons not members of the armed forces, is such territory
as is within the "theatre or zone of operations." This, however, raises
a more controversial question for it constitutionally requires the recon-
ciliation of such jurisdiction with: Article III, section 2 which provides
for "Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment" by jury; the
Fifth Amendment, which guarantees freedom from trial "for a capital
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of
a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval force"; and
the Sixth Amendment which guarantees to a defendant in a criminal
prosecution enumerated protective rights such as assistance of counsel
for his defense, etc. There has been implied in this Sixth Amendment,
the excepting clause of the Fifth Amendment, "except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces." " It is this excepting clause that gives
the answer. If an offense that is to be punished arises in the land or
naval forces, the one who has committed such offense obviously would
not be entitled to the express guarantee of the Fifth Amendment and
those implied in the Sixth Amendment. Conversely, to subject one
not a member of the armed forces to trial before a military tribunal 4t
in a case not arising in the land or naval forces, would be violative of
the constitutional guarantees already cited.47  But may it be said-that
a civilian who has committed an offense in the theatre of war or zone
of operations is within the excepting clause of the Fifth Amendment
and thus subject to trial by military commission? We think not.
Unfortunately, we have no judicial authority dealing with this
question to guide us with an answer, but it would seem that to include
civilians' activities or offenses in the language "cases arising in the land
43. Note (19o2) 15 HARv. L. REv. 850, 851.
44. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 53 Sup. Ct. 19o, 77 L. Ed. 375 (1932).
For an excellent survey of martial law in the United States, see RANKIN, WHEN THE
CIVIL LAW FAILS (1939). For a repudiation of the doctrine that permits states to in-
voke martial law, see Underhill, Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals it; the United States
(1924) 12 CALIF. L. REv. 159, 165-178.
45. Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U. S. I, 41 Sup. Ct 224, 65 L. Ed. 469 (1920) ; KUrtz
v. Moffitt, 115 U. S. 487, 6 Sup. Ct. 148, 29 L. Ed. 458 (885) ; Ex parte Reed, ioo
U. S. 13, 25 L. Ed. 538 (1879) ; Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. Ed. 281 (1866).
46. Ex parte Wildman, 29 Fed. Cas. 1232, No. I7,653a (D. C. Kansas, 1876).
47. Underhill, note 44supra, at 88.
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or naval forces" (italics supplied) is, to -say the least, straining the
meaning of words. It is submitted that the better interpretation would
be that the use of the word "in," before "the land or naval forces," indi-
cates an intention to confine the application of the excepting clause to
those who are "in"' or members of the land or naval forces. To go
beyond that is to expand a phrase of vital importance in derogation of
time-honored guarantees from oppression.48 But, even if the foregoing
interpretation of the Constitution were upheld, it does not follow at all
that there could be no trials of civilians before military commissions.
In the Quirin case, the opinion held that in no event can a defendant
demand as a constitutional right, trials by jury, unless the offense with
which he is charged was triable by a jury at common law and at the
time of the adoption of our Constitution. Hence, where a civilian is
charged with an offense against the law of war, th Quirin case settles
the rule that such person can be tried by military commission without
reference to the fact of whether the case is one "arising out of the land
or naval forces," or whether the offense was committed in the theatre
of operations, for jury trials in cases of offenses against the law of war
were unknown to the common law, or American jurisprudence at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution. It should be noted, though
since the Quirin case it may be purely academic, that the writers on
military law do not agree with the interpretation of the excepting clause
in the Fifth Amendment suggested above. Professor Morgan holds
that an offense charged against a civilian occurring in "the field of
operations or in the theatre of war would seem, by reasonable con-
struction, to constitute a case arising in the land forces." 49 The brief
for the Government in the Quirin case, to support the contention that
the saboteurs were included in the excepting clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment, points out that the clause in question refers to "cases arising in
the land and naval forces," not members of the land and fiaval forces 50
(italics supplied). -The difficulty with that contention is the fact that
it does not overcome the connotation of "forces," as being personnel of
the army and navy.
48. Professor Burdick in his book, THE LAW OF THE Am mCAN CoNsTITUTIoN
(I922) 265-266, agrees with the view indicated, stating that the inclusion of civilians
in the land or naval forces where their offense was committed in the theatre of opera-
tions "would seem to go to the extreme limit of constitutionality." However, he justi-
fies trials by military commissions of members of the opposing armies as legitimate
means of waging war; and of alien enemies on the ground that they are not protected
by constitutional guarantees, citing De Lacey v. United States, 249 Fed. 625 (C. C. A.
9th, i918). Such exceptions would appear sound. See also, Ballentine, Martial Law
(1912) 12 COL. L. REv. 529, 536.
49. Morgan, note 17 supra, at IO7.
5o. Respondent's Brief, at 39.
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The majority view of the military authorities holds that where an
offense otherwise cognizable by a military commission is committed in
a theatre of operations, it is a case "arising in the land or naval forces"
and thus not within the guarantee of Article III, Section II, and the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. We pass to an examination of the
meaning of "theatre of operations" or as it is sometimes called "theatre
of war," "zone of operations" or "field of operations."
These phrases have as many meanings as there are writers dealing
with them. They range from the limited meaning directed in the Mil-
ligan case of the area of actual conflict, to an area that could well cover
the entire country suggested by a United States District Court judge
in United States ex rel. Wessels v. McDonald,51 who stated propheti-
cally: "In this great World War through which we have just passed,
the field of operations which existed after the United States entered the
war, and especially in regard to naval operations, brought the port of
New York within the field of active operations. The implements of
warfare and the plan of carrying it- on in the last gigantic struggle
placed the United States fully within the field of active operations.
The term 'theatre of war', as used in the Milligan case, apparently was
intended to mean the territory of activity of conflict. With the progress
made in obtaining ways and means for devastation and destruction, the
territory of the United States was certainly within the field of active
operations."
In between these two extreme views, there are opinions of various
shades defining "theatre of operations," etc. Professor Morgan timor-
ously rejected the theory that the zone of operations comprises in fact
the entire country. He suggests, however, that "the time may come,
and may not be far distant, when this theory and none other will fit the
facts, and necessity will compel its adoption. But it is believed that
the term reasonably construed in the light of present day conditions,
should be confined to that area which comprehends the theatre of actual
hostilities, the lines of communication, and the reserves and service of
supply under actual military control, and that it cannot properly be
enlarged to cover the farms, factories and workshops under exclusively
civilian control, even though engaged in the production of supplies to
be used ultimately by the army." 52
5I. 265 Fed. 754 (E. D. N. Y. 192o) ; appeal dismissed, per stipulation, 256 U. S.
705, 41 Sup. Ct. 535, 65 L. Ed. 118o (1921). The United States Supreme Court in
Ex parte Quiri implies agreement with this view, 317 U. S. I, 36-37, 63 Sup. Ct. 2, is,
87 L. Ed. I, 13-14 (1942).
52. Morgan, note 17 supra, at 114-116; Wmq-, op. cit. supra note 29, at 139,
cites Morgan's language with seeming approval. See also, Dodd, The Case of Marais
(i9o2) i8 L. Q. REV. 143, 147.
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The foregoing was written in 1920, and with the present war of
"blitzkrieg," U-boat, parachuters and block-busters, we may say, in
Morgan's language, "The day has come!" " The view of the United
States District Court pronounced in United States ex rel. Wessels v.
McDonald commends itself at this time as the proper and realistic in-
terpretation of "theatre of operations" and especially if that phrase is
to be determinative of the territorial jurisdiction of military commis-
sions over civilians in time of war.
54
Reference has been made earlier in this consideration of jurisdic-
tion of military commissions to Articles of War 8i and 82 as they
relate to the persons subject to such commissions. It was seen that by
the weight of authority these Articles may be constitutionally upheld
against civilians, only if the offenses with which such persons are
charged, were committed where military government or martial law
exists, or in the theatre of operations. There is another question that
has been the subject of extended constitutional discussion in the 82nd
Article with reference to the territory in which spies may operate, and
be subject to a military commission.
The question centers about the word "elsewhere" in the 82nd
Article of War which renders amenable to trial by court-martial or
military commission "any person who in time of war shall be found
lurking or acting as a spy in or about any of the fortifications, posts,
quarters, or encampments of any of the armies of the Uuited States, or
elsewhere, . . ." (italics supplied). In what appears to be a con-
struction rendered in order to bring "elsewhere" within "cases arising
in the land or naval forces" insofar as it may be applied to civilians,
and especially citizens of the United States, it is said that the true
meaning is elsewhere "in the zone of operations or any other place un-
der the actual control or dominion of the military forces." " There
should be no objection to such construction if Profe~sor Morgan
adopted the definition of "theatre of operations" of the Wessels v.
McDonald case for there the court recognized that which time has
proved accurate; that "theatre of operations," under modern warfare,
embraces the entire country. The case dealt with the 82nd Article of
War and the defendant contended that: "The United States was a
field without the 'theatre of war' at the time of his activities during
which it was said he was a spy." As we have already pointed out, the
53. Miller, note :8 supra, at 2o2. Cf. Rules of Land Warfare, note 27 supra, at
59, §2 o5 (b).
54. In Ex parte Quirin, the petitionerg argued that it was not possible that the
entire United States could be regarded as a zone of rniltary operations, but did not.
press the point.
55. Morgan, note 17 supra, at zi4.
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court rejected this construction of "theatre of operations" and held
Wessels subject to summary trial by court-martial.56 If the limited
view of Professor Morgan, or the even narrower holding of the Milli-
gan case is to be used as the criterion of "theatre of operations," obvi-
ously an opinion that "elsewhere" means any place in the United States
renders the 82nd Article unconstitutional under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, as to civilians who are not in the theatre of operations as
construed. But reducing the scope of the broad "elsewhere" to a lim-
ited "theatre of operations" is to distort the words used by Congress,
in order that the Article may be termed constitutional. The sounder
position is to give the word "elsewhere" its true meaning as including
the entire area of the United States, and then with realistic accuracy
approve the language of the Wessels case thereby giving recognition to
contemporary fact instead of eighteenth century warfare.
But it will be recalled that in Ex parte Quirin, which is the only
case that reached the United States Supreme Court, wherein the 8ist
and 82nd Articles were in issue, the Court withheld its opinion thereon,
sustaining the jurisdiction of the military commission on violations of
the law of war. Thus, the constitutionality of the Articles stated re-
mains judicially unsettled in our law in their application to civilians.
One review of the Quirin case, moreover, properly predicts that the
constitutionality of these articles will never be passed upon because
resort will be made to charges within the broad category of the law of
war where relieving, corresponding or aiding the enemy, or spying, is
charged. The reason for this is obvious. It would be unnecessary for
the Government to expose itself to a defeat based on the constitution-
ality of the articles mentioned, when it can bring persons before mili-
tary commissions by invoking the doctrine of the Quirin case which
upholds such trials of citizens or aliens for violations of the law of
war.5 7
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF TRIALS BEFORE MILITARY COMMISSION
It has been definitely settled since the case of Ex parte Vallandig-
ham,5 s that the proceedings of a military commission cannot be reviewed
56. Professor Schiller, in his MILITARY LAW AND DEFENSE LEGISLATION (1941)
at 507, mentions that under an opinion of the Judge Advocate General in i918, the"elsewhere" of the 82nd Article extends over the entire United States, citing Digest
of Opinions of the Judge Advocate General, Apr. 6, 1918; Dig. Op. J. A. G., 1912-
1930, § 1337.
57. Note (1942) 41 MicH. L. REv. 481, 490, 494.
58. I Wall. 243, 17 L. Ed. 589 (1863). Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and
the National Emergency (1942) 55 HARv. L. REv. 1253, 1283, n. 125, has an account
of the background of the Vallandigham case. It is mentioned that the entire proceed-
ings were caused by poor judgment on the part of the Commanding General, Burnside,
of the Department of Ohio, wherein Vallandigham carried on his activities. The case
was finally disposed of by delivering Vallandigham beyond the Union lines.
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by certiorari. This rule has likewise been applied where certiorari was
sought to review the proceedings before courts-martial. 59
But it has been repeatedly decided that the jurisdiction of a mili-
tary tribunal, including the question of whether such tribunal was
legally constituted, may always be reviewed by the civil judiciary.
This may be done by a defendant in a trial before a military tribunal,
petitioning a civil court to issue a writ of habeas corpus; the extent of
that review, however, will be a determination of whether the military
tribunal was legally constituted and has jurisdiction in conformity With
the Constitution and statutes-briefly, the law of the land. If the mili-
tary commission, or other military tribunal, be without jurisdiction,
for whatever the reason, the court will find that the trial before it is
illegal and that the defendant's detention likewise is illegal.60
The writ of habeas corpus, from the earliest days of this republic,
has been regarded as one of the most important of the civil liberties."1
So important has it been considered that its suspension was prohibited
in the original Constitution "unless when in Cases of Rebellion or In-
vasion, the public Safety may require it." 62 But the only effect of the
suspension of the writ as constitutionally provided, is to deny to the
person arrested the opportunity of seeking his release; it does not grant
license for arrests.
63
The constitutional provision just cited, clear though it appears,
has given rise to the problem of determining what department of the
government is empowered to exercise the right to suspend the writ,
under the circumstances that permit the suspension.
59. Collins v. McDonald, 258 U. S. 416, 42 Sup. Ct. 326, 66 L. Ed. 692 (1922);
Grafton v. United States, 2o6 U. S. 333, 27 Sup. Ct. 749, 51 L. Ed. 1O84 (i9o6) ; Car-
ter v. McClaughry, 183 U. S. 365, 22 Sup. Ct. I81, 46 L. Ed. 236 (1902) ; Swaim v.
United States, I65 U. S. 553, 17 Sup. Ct. 448, 41 L. Ed. 823 (1896) ; Smith v. Whitney,
116 U. S. 167, 6 Sup. Ct 570, 29 L. Ed. 6oi (1885) (Court-martial was held in this
case to be without jurisdiction) ; Dynes v. Hoover, 2o How. 65, 15 L. Ed. 838 (1857).
Miller, note 28 supra, at 402, argues for judicial review of proceedings before military
commissions when used with martial law. He expresses the opinion that a proper sys-
tem could be set up so that there would be no delay and thus a lessening of the efficacy
of martial law. It is apparent that the emergency that requires martial law, also re-
quires expedition of action. If judicial review can be arranged for with promptness, it
is certainly desirable for the preservation of the American principle of a fair trial by
an unbiased court. Cf. U. S. v. S urratt, 27 Fed. Cas 1367, No. 16,423 (1865) (Lin-
coln Conspiracy Trial).
6o. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 63 Sup. Ct. 2, 87 L. Ed. i (1942) ; In re Grim-
ley, 137 U. S. 147, 1I Sup. Ct 54, 34 L. Ed. 636 (i8go) ; Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2,
18 L. Ed. 281 (1866).
61. CoawIN, THE CoNsTTUToN AND WHAT IT MEANs TODAY (1938) 61-63. For
the history of the writ of habeas corpus, see Jenks, The Story of Habeas Corpus
(I9O2) I8 L. Q. Rxv. 64. For the legislative history in the United States of the stat-
utory right of the federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus, see WILL OUGBY, op.
cit. supra note 25, at 127-129.
62. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 9, Cl. 2.
63. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. Ed. 281 (1866). Ballantine, note 48 supra,
at 535-536.
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During the Civil War, President Lincoln, confronted with rebel-
lion and on the basis of an opinion by Attorney General Bates,64 sus-
pended the privilege of habeas corpus. Shortly thereafter, a prominent
citizen of Baltimore by the name of Merryman, was arrested and im-
prisoned in Fort McHenry on a charge of aiding the enemy. Appli-
cation was made to Chief Justice Taney of the United States Supreme
Court while he was sitting in the United States Circuit Court at Balti-
more for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner challenged the Presi-
dent's suspension of the writ as a violation of the Constitution. The
Chief Justice issued the writ; it was served on the officer in charge at
Fort McHenry, General Cadwalader, who refused to deliver the defend-
ant before the Court because of the crime with which he was charged,
and the fact that he had been authorized by the President of the United
States in such cases, to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Chief
Justice immediately issued an attachment for contempt against Gen-
eral Cadwalader for disobeying the writ to produce Merryman. The
United States Marshal being unable to serve the attachment, Taney
filed an opinion holding that the right to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus under Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the Constitution, rested
in Congress, and that the President had no such right.65 This ruling
is based on the fact that the Constitutional provision dealing with
habeas corpus is part of Article I of the Constitution which deals with
the powers of the legislative branch of our government.6 6 With this
opinion, the Chief Justice transferred to the President the responsibility
of enforcing the law of the land under his oath of office and the Con-
stitutional mandate that "he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed. . ,, 67
Despite the decision of the venerable Chief Justice, President Lin-
coln, supported by the opinion of his Attorney-General, adhered to the
position that he had taken. The necessities of the rebellion, he held,
gave him the power not only to suspend habeas corpus, but also to
institute censorship, military arrest and military trial. But in addi-
64. io Ops. Atty. Gen. 74 (I86I).
65. Ex parte Merryman, I7 Fed. Cas. 144, 146, No. 9487 (i86I). Accord: Ex
parte Bollman, 4 Cr. 75, 2 L. Ed. 554 (i8o7) ; McCall v. McDowell, i5 Fed. Cas. 1235,
No. 8673 (C. C. D. Calif. 1867) ; United States v. Porter, 27 Fed. Cas. 599, No. 16,o74a
(C. C. D. Col. 186I). Cf. Ex parte Field, 9 Fed. as. i, No. 4761 (C. C. D. Vt. 1862).
66. Fairman, note 58 supra, at 1280; Note (942) 41 MicH. L. REV. 481, 484-486.
67. U. S. CONsT. Art. II, § 3. A review of the opinions among the framers of the
Constitution on the Congressional right to suspend habeas corpus may be found in
Hatcher, Martial Law and Habeas Corpus: Extent of Warpower in EMergency (1939)
25 A. B. A. J. 375. For a presentation of contemporary comment on the Merryman
case, see 2 WARREN, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1937) 368-374.
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tion to the Merryman decision, several state courts refused to recog-
nize as valid, the President's Proclamation suspending habeas corpus.6
Although there has never been a final judicial determination of this
issue, no case ever having gone to the United States Supreme Court,
it is now generally agreed that the writ of habeas corpus can be con-
stitutionally suspended only by Congress. But Justice Hatcher in his
article on martial law and habeas corpus,6 9 expresses the view that the
framers of the Constitution knew that in an emergency when quick
action would be necessary, there would be no time for Congressional
investigation. He concludes that the Constitutional provision referring
to habeas corpus did not give an exclusive grant of all power over
habeas corpus to Congress as Taney held, but rather restricted the
power of Congress to authorize the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus by the courts; the constitutional provision had no application to
the occasional disregard of such writ by a military commander because
of an emergency.7 °
Congress impliedly recognized the soundness of the ruling of Chief
Justice Taney, and at the same time set at rest the disputed question
of the validity of the President's order suspending the right of habeas
corpus, by enacting legislation authorizing such suspension by the
President as, in his judgment, shall be necessary.7 1 It was this same
statute that also provided for discharge of prisoners who had not been
indicted by a grand jury, that enabled Lambdin P. Milligan to obtain
his release by a decision of the Supreme Court. It was likewise this
statute wherein Congress approved and confirmed the acts performed
under Presidential proclamation prior to the legislation; this provision
was subsequently declared to be ex post facto and hence unconstitu-
tional.
7 2
Since the decisions mentioned, there has been no case before the
courts where the authority to suspend habeas corpus has been brought
68. Ex parte Benedict, 3 Fed. Cas. 159, No. 1292 (D. C. N. Y. x862) ; Griffin v.
Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370 (1863) ; In re Kemp, x6 Wisc. 359 (1863). Contra: At the con-
clusion of the trial of the Lincoln assassinators, application was made on behalf of
Mary E. Surratt, one of the defendants, to Federal Judge Wylie for a writ of habeas
corpus. The writ was granted, but on the return, General Hancock accompanied by
Attorney General Speed, appeared before the Court and made return that by order of
the President, the writ of habeas corpus had been suspended and hence Mary E. Sur-
ratt was not produced. The Court ruled that it yielded to the Order of the President.
DE WITr, THE JUDICIAL MURDER OF MARY E. SURRATT (1895) 122. It should be
noted, however, that this application was subsequent to 12 STAT. 755 (1863), which
authorized Presidential suspension.
69. Note 67 supra, at 377.
7o. RANKIN, op. cit. supra note 44, contains a review of the legal literature writ-
ten after the Merrynan, decision on the right of the President to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus.
71. 12 STAT. 755 (1863).
72. In re Murphy, 17 Fed. Gas. 1o3o, No. 9947 (C. C. D. Mo. 1867).
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in issue, until 1942 when President Roosevelt's Proclamation denied
to the persons therein mentioned, the privilege to seek ". . . any rem-
edy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any
such remedy or proceeding sought on their behalf, in the courts of the
United States, or of its states, territories, and possessions, except under
such regulations as the Attorney-General, with the approval of the Sec-
retary of War, may from time to time prescribe."
Counsel for the petitioners before the Supreme Court argued that
the foregoing provision deprives the petitioners of the right to habeas
corpus, and hence is unconstitutional and invalid. They based their
argument on two grounds: first, there is no statutory authority for
such Executive action; second, it contravenes Article I, Section 9,
Clause 2 of the Constitution which deals with the powers of and the
restraints on Congress and wherein is described the circumstances un-
der which the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended. They further
claimed that the fact that petitioners are enemy aliens could furnish no
basis for depriving them of the right to a writ of habeas corpus in order
to test the validity of their detention."3 The Government replied that
enemies who invade our country in time of war, do not have such privi-
lege of habeas corpus, and the argument is supported by numerous
English text and judicial authorities, which hold that a prisoner of war
is not entitled to apply to the English courts for a writ of habeas corpus.
An additional point of interest was made by the Government in
seeking to withhold the right of habeas corpus from the petitioners.
Under an Act of July 6, 1798,74 the President is authorized by Procla-
mation to direct the conduct of the United States toward "all natives,
citizens, denizens, or subjects' of nations with whom this country is
at war, and also "the manner and degree of the restraint to which they
shall be subject . . and to establish any other regulations which
are found necessary in the premises and for the public safdty." Relying
on this statute and the case of DeLacey v. United States 75 the Attorney
General argued for the denial of the writ. The petitioners urged, how-
ever, that the statute cited could not authorize a proclamation depriv-
ing an enemy alien of the right to test the validity of his detention. The
case of Ex parte Risse 76 was relied upon holding that an enemy alien
could obtain a determination of the validity of his internment by habeas
73. Petitioners' Brief, at 18-ig, wherein is quoted the opinion of Attorney General
Palmer, 31 Op. Atty. Gen. 356, 361, "Milligan was a citizen of the United States. But
the provisions of the Constitution upon which the decision was based, are not limited
to citizens; they apply to citizens and aliens alike."
74. 40 STAT. 531 (i8), 50 U. S. C. A. §21 (1934).
75. 249 Fed. 625 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918).
76. 257 Fed. 5O2 (D. C. N. Y. igig).
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corpus. However, the Supreme Court in its opinion recognized the
right of the petitioners to test in the Courts the constitutionality of
their trial by military commission. The Court, with two brief sentences,
passed over the question in order to consider the basis of the Commis-
sion's authority, saying: "But there is certainly nothing in the Procla-
mation to preclude access to the courts for determining its applicability
to the particular case. And neither the Proclamation nor the fact that
they are enemy aliens forecloses consideration by the courts of petition-
ers' contentions that the Constitution and laws of the United States
constitutionally enacted forbid their trial by military commission." 77
The military being, as a matter of Anglo-American tradition, subordi-
nate to the civil, the Court will zealously protect accused persons in
their right to civil trials with the attendant protections.
The duty of the court was expressed by Chief Justice Stone in the
Quirin case: "In view of the public importance of the questions raised
by their petitions and of the duty which rests on the courts, in time of
war as well as in time of leace, to preserve unimpaired the constitu-
tional safeguards of civil liberty, and because in our opinion the public
interest required that we consider and decide those questions without
any avoidable delay, we directed that petitioners' applications be set
down for full oral argument at a special term of this Court, convened
on July 29, 1942." 78
A very recent case involving the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus arose out of the Pearl Harbor attack of December 7, 1941.
Governor Poindexter had declared martial law in the Territory of
Hawaii and under an Act of Congress the writ of habeas corpus was
suspended. Dr. Hans Zimmerman, an American citizen, was detained
by the military authorities, whereupon application was made on his
behalf, to United States District Court Judge Delbert E. Metzger for a
writ of habeas corpus. 'The writ was denied, not because the Court
held that the suspension was proper, but rather because, "The Court
. . . believes that a writ should issue as a matter of law. But it would
be in clear defiance of an order of the military governor to issue the
writ. I feel the Court is under duress and is not able to carry out the
function of the Court as is its duty. For that reason alone, the Court
declines to issue the writ." '9 It would seem that since Congress had
authorized the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus,"" the Court's
decision should have been an immediate denial of the application."'
77. 317 U. S. 1, 25, 63 Sup. Ct. 2, 9, 87 L. Ed. 1, 7.
78. Id. at i9, 63 Sup. Ct. at 6-7, 87 L. Ed. at 4.
79. Fairman, note 58 supra, at 1298.
8o. Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. i44, No. 9487 (i86).
8i. Fairman, note 58 supra, at 1298.
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However, Judge Metzger apparently had in mind the language of the
Court in the Milligan case, that a writ of habeas corpus should issue
as a matter of course and on the return the court decides whether the
party applying is denied the right to proceed further; the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not suspend the writ
itself. On appeal, the majority of the Circuit Court of Appeals 82
affirmed Judge Metzger's denial of the application, but on the basis of
the Congressional authorization. As for the issuance of the writ as a
matter of course, the majority followed the Supreme Court's ruling in
the Quirin case, where it was held proper to consider the application on
the merits so that a writ need not issue where it is apparent that the
petitioner would be remanded to custody. But the dissenting judge
relied upon the language of the majority in Ex parte Milligan to uphold
the issuance of the writ as a matter of course. "The 'privilege' meant
by the Constitutional provision is not the right to obtain a writ, but
the right to be discharged from custody by a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding." 83
While the last mentioned decision is not that of the highest court,
we believe it represents the law. It is in accord with Ex parte Merry-
man 84 which has long been regarded as sound in its holding that
Congress could constitutionally suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
When such suspension is authorized by Congress, the jurisdiction of a
military commission could not be tested judicially.
III. CONCLUSION
We have assumed in this discussion of the constitutional limita-
tions on trials by military commissions, that at least under certain cir-
cumstances, there is needed a more summary means of dealing with
offenders who interfere with, or affect war efforts of the United States,
than can be provided by the civil courts. We are told *that it is the
law's delay that requires a more expeditious trial and punishment, and
this justifies a lesser degree of protection to an accused.8 5 This argu-
ment is hardly impressive when the law courts are operating normally.
It is an indictment of our entire criminal court system, our judicial
personnel; perhaps more important, it is an admission of our inability
to correct such weakness. True, where martial law or military govern-
ment 86 are in effect, we must recognize the desirability for quick trial
82. 132 F. (2d) 442 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942).
83. Id. at 451.
84. 17 Fed. Cas. i44, No. 9487 (i86i).
85. Note (1943) 56 HAav. L. REv. 631, 642.
86. These terms are used in accordance with the definitions of Chief Justice Chase,
in the minority opinion of Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, i8 L. Ed. 28I (1866) ; see
note 28 supra.
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and punishment rather than detention of all persons accused until the
civil courts are again established. The time for such re-establishment
being oftentimes indefinite, the detention without a speedy trial is itself
contrary to the spirit of the Constitution.
7
It is therefore believed, that a good argument could be developed
against the use ofmilitary commissions in such a case as that of Ex
parte Quirin.8 8 It may be that this case could have been tried under
the Espionage Act of 1917,89 but if the trial had been conducted under
that statute, the defendants could not have been sentenced to death.90
To argue that anything short of the death penalty for saboteurs and
spies in time of war is insufficient, raises the moral issue of capital
punishment that is beyond the purpose and scope of this paper.91
Disregarding the issue of the need for the death penalty as proper
punishment in cases that involve offenses against the law of war, there
is one reason at least, that is cogent for the use of military courts. The
offenses charged have necessarily been committed while the country is
at war. It may be assumed, as was the situation in Ex parte Quirin,
92
that the detection of such offenses, the manner in which the defendants
were apprehended, and other elements that comprise the Government's
case in proving the guilt of the defendants, include information that
would, if disclosed, be of value to the enemy. Under the Sixth Amend-
ment to the Constitution, "the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial. . . ." With such trials in the civil courts, the infor-
mation that should be withheld from public circulation for the general
welfare of the country, becomes available to the enemy. The result
presents two possibilities to the authorities; either permit espionage and
sabotage to go unpunished or punish the persons involved and reveal
publicly all information at hand.
The comment of Mr. Theodore Miller justifying the use of the
military tribunals in time of war, we believe, goes too far. "Finally, it
might be argued that my proposal involves a destruction of democratic
87. Cf. U. S. CONST. AmEND. VI.
88. 317 U. S. 1, 63 Sup. Ct. 2, 87 L. Ed. I (1942).
89. 40 STAT. 217 (1917), 50 U. S. C. A. §§ 31-32 (1934). Assistant Attorney
General Cox, in testifying before the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representa-
tives, stated that "the maximum penalty which could have been given to them (refer-
ring to the eight Nazi saboteurs) in an ordinary criminal court would probably have
been 2 years, for the crimes of conspiring to commit sabotage." 89 Cong. Rec., March
23, 1943, at 2431.
90. 40 STAT. 217-218 (917), 50 U. S. C. A. §§ 31-32 (934).
91. During World War I, a bill was introduced in the United States Senate by
Senator Chamberlain, which had for its purpose the punishment of all persons guilty
of espionage or sedition by military tribunals. The bill being severely criticized and
disapproved by President Wilson as "uncalled for, unnecessary and unconstitutional,"
was never passed. Arthur Krock, N. Y. Times, July 14, 1942, p. I8, col. 5.
92. 317 U. S. 1, 63 Sup. Ct. 2, 87 L. Ed. 1 (1942).
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institutions and safeguards in time of war, and is not in keeping with
the American tradition. This may be answered: Recent events in
Europe indicate that it is best for all the passengers in the boat to trust
the Captain during the storm; best to reassert the democratic ideal
after the war is won, rather than to lose the war and Democracy. The
pitiful fate of France, entirely subjected to the dictatorial will in just
five weeks, indicates that we must qualify Mr. Justice Davis' statement
in Ex parte Milligan, that a country, preserved at the sacrifice of all
the cardinal principles of liberty, is not worth the cost of preservation,
lest we, like France, lose not only our immediate liberty, but our homes,
our lives, and our nation as well!" 93 Mr. Miller would apparently
scrap the Constitution during times of war and approve the doctrine
inter arma leges silent, though contrary to every thread of democracy.
We believe that such lengths need not be gone. The Wa r Security Act
introduced into Congress upon the suggestion of Attorney General
Biddle 14 would correct the shortcomings of the present situation. The
bill provides for expeditious trials of war crimes in civil courts; pun-
ishments commensurate with the nature of the offense; and most
important, provision is made to prevent the disclosure of information
that would be of value to the enemy. Thus, American democracy may
be preserved even in the presence of total war.
93. Miller, note 28 supra, at 209.
94. H. R. REP. No. 2087, 78th Cong., ist Sess. (943).
